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With their book Neuro-Enhancement: Ethik vor neuen Herausforderungen, the editors Bettina 
Schöne-Seifert, Davinia Talbot, Uwe Opolka, and Johann S. Ach have delivered a collection 
of articles providing a cross-section of the ongoing debate over cognitive and mood 
enhancement in Germany. As a pharmacopsychologist working on the neurochemistry of 
cognition and emotion I have followed this debate for several years now and I have felt 
uneasy about it from the start. What follows might rather be a perspectival response to the 
presented volume than a classical book review. But considering the current proliferation of 
publications on the ethics of neuroenhancement it seems about time to call into question some 
of the pharmacological and epidemiological presumptions on which this emergent body of 
literature – including the book at hand – is based. 
The volume Neuro-Enhancement was developed from papers presented at a one-week 
conference organized by the editors at the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg in Delmenhorst, 
Germany in 2005. All contributors are established experts in the field of medical ethics, but 
they come from different disciplines such as philosophy, political science, and medicine. The 
chapters are divided into four thematic sections. The first provides a conceptual framework 
distinguishing neuroenhancement of healthy subjects from the medical treatment of patients. 
Here, Saskia Nagel and Achim Stephan, for example, draw a normative map of conceivable 
enhancement options. And Joel Anderson discusses whether the use of imaginable future 
neuroprotheses providing music lovers with super hearing would be ethically legitimate. The 
second section illustrates the problems and chances of cognitive enhancement in particular. 
For instance, Sabine Müller poses the question whether, from idealist and utilitarian 
perspectives respectively, the enhancement of intelligence would be morally obligatory – if it 
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became possible. The third section reviews issues of emotional enhancement addressing the 
challenge posed by drugs such as Prozac to authenticity. And the final section discusses the 
ethical implications of neuroenhancement for society at large. As most of the preceding 
contributions, Bernward Gesang’s consideration of the social risks and benefits of different 
kinds of enhancement or Petra Schaper-Rinkel’s discussion of the political consequences of 
thinkable further developments of neuroimplants connecting people in new ways presuppose 
that, as the editors put it, neuroenhancement “will actually turn out to be efficient, agreeable 
and therefore, from an individual perspective, attractive.” 
 From a pharmacological point of view, however, this presupposition is questionable. 
In my discussion, I will focus on what the book has to say about the enhancement of cognitive 
performance (although similar critiques could be developed with respect to emotional 
enhancement, biological and technical brain implants, and genetic manipulations). I will not 
engage with the ethical, social, and political consequences of enhancement discussed by the 
authors (as one could usually expect from a book review) as I believe that already their 
pharmacological and epidemiological premises are unrealistic. 
 Almost all contributions to the volume Neuro-Enhancement are based on the 
assumption that, in the near future, we will have access to compounds that are not only 
effective cognitive enhancers, but also safe and well-tolerated and therefore suitable to be 
taken by everybody (see, for example, the essays of Schaper-Rinkel and Synofzik). This, 
however, is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future. It seems that many medical ethicists 
have been led astray by exaggerated promises of neuroscientists who are either collaborators 
of the pharmaceutical industry or forced to overstate their own results to get increasingly 
competitive research funding. As a matter of fact, we are currently even unable to fully restore 
disturbed intellectual functioning in psychiatric or neurological diseases and we still do not 
know how to achieve this goal in the future.  
Let me briefly sum up where we currently stand with respect to cognitive 
enhancement. In the discussed book, two drugs are repeatedly referred to as supposedly 
effective cognitive enhancers: methylphenidate (Ritalin©, Concerta©), and modafinil 
(Provigil ©, Vigil©). Together with amphetamine and the illegal drug cocaine, these 
substances share some neurochemical mechanisms and psychotropic effects which justify 
calling all of them stimulants. These drugs are affecting the dopamine and noradrenaline 
systems and their main effects are an increase of vigilance, arousal, and motivation. But, as 
far as we currently know, they have no direct effect on specific cognitive domains such as 
memory or executive functions (de Jongh et al., 2008). Thus, stimulants are rather second-
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order cognitive enhancers. For the sake of clarity, they would better be called vigilance or 
motivation enhancers. Interestingly, for all of these substances it has been shown that they 
increase cognitive performance only in subjects with low baseline capacities whereas in 
subjects with higher baseline performance often deteriorates (Mattay et al., 2000; Mattay et 
al., 2003; Mehta et al., 2000; Muller et al., 2004; Randall et al., 2005). This points to a 
principle brain mechanism that can be found in several neuronal systems and circuits: the 
inverse U-function. According to this principle, enhancement is only possible as long as we 
do not have an optimal level of arousal, vigilance, or neurotransmitter concentration (Arnsten 
& Li, 2005; Kahneman, 1973; Mattay et al., 2003). Hence, an already optimally tuned brain 
can hardly be enhanced. Given that usually our brains already perform to the best of their 
ability and that the homeostasis of this organ is very sensitive, general enhancement for 
everyone seems strictly limited. Against this background, it is not surprising that stimulants – 
and here in particular modafinil – are effective to counter cognitive decline caused by sleep 
deprivation. It was shown that caffeine – a well-known and effective vigilance enhancer with 
tolerable side effects – was about as effective as modafinil to antagonize sleep deprivation-
induced impairments, for example, of reaction time (Killgore et al., 2008; Wesensten et al., 
2002). However, cognitive effects in well-rested healthy subjects are small and hard to detect 
(for review see Kumar, 2008).  
Moreover, several studies have shown that an increased performance in one cognitive 
domain often goes along with a decrease in performance in another domain. For example, we 
could enhance our working memory but simultaneously decrease our long-term memory or 
vice versa but we will never be able enhance both simultaneously (de Jongh et al., 2008). The 
same is true regarding focusing vs. shifting attention and several other cognitive functions. 
These phenomena are further complicated by the fact that effects vary between individuals (a 
drug may enhance domain X and impair domain Y in individual A, whereas in subject B 
domain X is impaired and domain Y is enhanced) (Clatworthy et al., 2009).  
Because of the vast complexity of the brain, it seems likely that we will not be able to 
overcome trade-offs between enhancement and simultaneous impairment by drugs. Apart 
from the collateral adverse effects on cognitive functions, the available substances have many 
psychiatric and somatic side effects which make them not well suited for use in healthy 
humans only for the purpose of enhancing vigilance or motivation. For example, all 
stimulants bear a risk of addiction, which can be explained by their specific mechanism of 
action (Berridge, 2007). Thus, I trust in the old pharmacological principle that there is no 
effect without a side effect, which is essentially true for all drugs acting on the brain. Our 
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brain is of such complexity and its neurotransmitter systems are so strongly interlaced that 
turning a small screw in one system generates unpredictable effects in all other systems with 
corresponding consequences for behavior. Neuroscience has just scratched the surface of a 
still undiscovered universe. 
 As we have seen there is no genuine cognitive enhancer available to date. There are 
several current attempts to develop more specifically acting compounds such as memory 
enhancers. However, none of the drugs tested so far have shown replicable and significant 
effects in healthy human volunteers (de Jongh et al., 2008; Lanni et al., 2008). Thus, we are 
still waiting for an effective drug that enhances cognition at least in patients suffering from 
mental dysfunctions. But it seems dubitable whether we will ever see the arrival of drugs 
significantly improving cognition in healthy subjects as presupposed in many contributions to 
Neuro-Enhancement. Certainly not in the near future. 
 However, the topicality of the book is not only based on such futurology, but also on 
an – equally questionable – diagnosis of the present. In their introduction, Schöne-Seifert and 
Talbot argue that already available cognitive enhancers such as methylphenidate and 
modafinil are increasingly prescribed beyond their actual indications. They convey a sense of 
urgency: “More and more students, professors, and managers are already taking drugs for 
neuroenhancement purposes.“ Schaper-Rinkel believes that a market for neuroenhancement is 
developing and that its commercial significance will strongly increase in the near future (p. 
299). 
 There is nothing new about such recreational and off-label use of stimulants. From the 
1940s to the 1960s, there was an epidemic abuse of amphetamines in countries like the USA, 
Great Britain, or Sweden with millions of users. In 1969, shortly before the distribution of 
amphetamines was legally restricted, the estimated prevalence of stimulant misuse in the US 
was comparable to 2002 (Rasmussen, 2008). Although, at the time, most amphetamines were 
sold as mild antidepressants they were also advertised for the enhancement of “mental 
alertness” (Rasmussen, 2008). Thus, the supposed urgency of the situation is not due to the 
fact that we are facing an unprecedented epidemic. 
In fact, the extent of cognitive enhancer abuse today has often been exaggerated (see 
the essay of Talbot, p. 325). A frequently cited study reported that up to 13% of high school 
students and up to 20% of college students in the US tried methylphenidate (Kapner, 2003). 
However, a more recent meta-analysis has shown that the one-year prevalence of experiences 
with stimulant cognitive enhancers is only 4% while the lifetime prevalence is 7% (Sussman 
et al., 2006). Moreover, the misuse was most prevalent among white male college students 
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struggling with their grades and living in larger urban areas (McCabe et al., 2005). These 
youth also tend to use illegal drugs such as cannabis, alcohol, MDMA, and cocaine (Sussman 
et al., 2006). Interestingly, more than 40% of the students reported that they use 
methylphenidate and amphetamine not only for performance enhancement but also to improve 
their mood, to get “high”, or for going clubbing (Sussman et al., 2006; Teter et al., 2005). The 
misuse of prescription stimulants is highest between 19 and 24 years and then decreases with 
increasing age (Johnston et al., 2005). And, finally, the lifetime prevalence of 
methylphenidate use in US college students seems to be decreasing rather than increasing, 
dropping from 5.7% in 2002 to 3.9% in 2006 (Kapner, 2008). In Germany, in a recent survey 
of a big health insurance program, less than 1% of the employees reported that they had used 
stimulants at least once in their lives against tiredness and sleepiness (0.93%) or for better 
concentration (0.63%) (DAK, 2009). These numbers show that the diagnosed epidemic of 
cognitive enhancer abuse is inexistent.  
A further result of several surveys was that women prefer the use of antidepressants or 
sedative drugs whereas men are more inclined toward the use of stimulants to enhance their 
work performance (e.g., DAK, 2009). This phenomenon points to the fact that not everyone is 
equally interested in enhancement of his or her intellectual performance. Apart from gender 
differences, I suppose that personality exerts a strong effect on the felt need to enhance 
cognitive performance. I would predict that narcissistic and ambitious personalities are 
especially prone to the use of cognitive enhancers. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there is 
no study that has investigated the influence of personality on the preference of cognitive 
enhancers. 
Thus, there is no increasing or epidemic use of cognitive enhancers to date, and it is 
unlikely that such a trend will develop given that seemingly only a minority of the population 
is interested in regular use. Moreover, as stated above, a large number of potential users will 
experience somatic side effects or negative effects on cognition that will result in 
discontinuation of use. If the epidemiological account that I am providing is correct, then the 
question is whether we are actually facing a problematic serious enough to warrant the large-
scale debate over neuroenhancement to which the discussed volume contributes. 
 In summary, the book Neuro-Enhancement provides a comprehensive compilation of 
articles giving a good overview of the current debate over the ethics of cognitive 
enhancement. Let me emphasize that I do not take issue with the philosophical quality of the 
contributions. But, from my perspective as a neuroscientist, the debate which is so well 
represented by the book is based on dubious assumptions. The participants of this discussion 
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often claim that their speculative approach provides us with the unique opportunity to discuss 
the ethical consequences of new technologies before they are fully developed. At least this 
one time, ethics could be ahead of technology. However, do we really need a debate on a 
technology that will probably never materialize?  
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